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The Effect of New brand’s Entry
on the Price Strategy of Incumbent Retailers
Suhhyue Lee*

According to Resource Dependence theory, an organization’s behavior and strategy is affected by
external resources. An organization has diverse resources interacting with environment. Because
organization cannot focus on all those resources, it concentrates on its critical resources. In market
environment, firm responds to other firms by controlling their internal critical resources or manages
interdependency with environment to get market share. Thus Firm should choose best behavior and
strategy when internal and external resources are change. When new brand enters, incumbents might
change their strategy to protect their market share depending on critical value. More precisely, incumbents
sharing market with entrant respond, but incumbents having competitive internal resources do not. In
this article, we study incumbent's responses to a new brand entry and long-term effect. We show
that how incumbents change their price strategy in reaction to the new brand’ entry and also show
these responses vary depending on interdependency of internal resources and external environments
and ownership.
Key words: New brand, Price Strategy, Market Commonality, Resource Similarity, Ownership

According to Resource Dependence theory

or manages interdependency with environment

(Pfeffer, 1978), an organization’s behavior and

to get market share and discretionary power.

strategy is affected by external resources. Because

Thus firm’s behavior and strategy becomes more

an organization has diverse resources interact-

competitive concerning interdependency of in-

ing with environment, organization concentrates

ternal and external resources. When new event

on its critical resource among them. In market

occurs and it causes off-balance in market, firm

environment, firm responds to market condition

decides whether stay or change. If a firm has

by concentrating its internal critical resources

competitive internal resources, it stays. If a firm
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is affected by new event, it changes its strat-

need to decide how long they can remain passive.

egy to accommodate market condition. Thus

If the attack has no direct effect, incumbents

new event makes market more competitive in

retain their existing strategy. As Kardes and

short-run, and it makes balanced market by

Kalyanaram (1992) emphasize the order of en-

lowering entry barrier in the long-run. Through

try effect, frontier firm may stay because it al-

this process, market makes balance and firm is

ready has competitive in market. On the other

progressed.

hand, if the attack has direct affect, incumbents

The reasons that the market loses balance

may respond. When incumbents recognize a

are as follows. First, when economic condition

new event as a threat, additional cost or loss,

changes suddenly, exogenous variables could

they change their interdependency with exoge-

affect firm’s production, cost and marketing

nous variables rather than stick to independent

strategies. Second, when new technology de-

strategy to protect market power. As Expectancy-

velops at rapid race, “Blue Ocean”, which is

Valence theory (Atkinson, 1964; House, 1971:

completely different with traditional market,

Vroom, 1964) said, firms establish their strat-

could appear. For example, digital camera oc-

egy for expected outcomes. Thus when a new

cupies market instead of film camera, or offset

brand enters, the most important thing that

press manufactures confronted with digital printing.

firms consider is interdependency with external

Last one is the introduction of new brand. The

environment and internal resources based on

introduction of new technology, opening of a

expectancy-valence theory. As for their ex-

new field, changing market condition and en-

pectations of result, they decide whether they

tering new brand, all of them have something

adjust their strategy or not.

in common that new event causes lower entry

Previous research much did in new brand

barrier and also it makes new balanced market.

entrance and incumbent’s strategy responses.

When new brand enters, incumbents respond

Because low-price strategy can reduce the

to protect their market share. More precisely,

market share penalty for being a later entrant

incumbents influenced by exogenous resources

(Dean, Lester and Lesley 2012), new brand

respond, but incumbents having critical internal

adopts flexible price strategy to gain market share

resources do not. New brand might be an at-

and to lower loyalty of pioneer. Also competi-

tack as how much it influences to incumbents.

tion between Private brand and incumbent be-

When new brand enters and it simultaneously

come more intense when quality makes no dif-

threatens several incumbents in market, it is

ference (Dhar and hoch 1997). Competition can

expected to provoke many responses. When

be very intense with prices and profits easily

confronted with new brand at first, incumbents

eroded when comparable resource endowments
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and market positions face one another. (Baum

rent and future customer needs. And market-

& Haveman 1997; Deephouse 1999; Gimeno

oriented firms endeavor to adjust customer's

& Chen 1998). If the dominant brand enjoys a

needs and it leads to increase performance and

strong asymmetric competitive advantage, a

profit (Narver and Slater. 1990). Because firm's

differentiated strategy is optimal. If the asym-

ownership affects market originality and in turn

metric competitive advantage of the dominant

firm's performance, incumbent’s price strategy

brand is weak, a challenger strategy is optimal

will be different as entrant’s ownership. Thomadsen

(Carpenter and Nakamoto 1990). Firms that

(2005) analyzed that firms' ownership and lo-

differentiate their resources and market position

cation influence its price and showed that mar-

from competitors become insulated from the

ket leader firm's price are higher than weaker

actions of rivals. (Lieberman and Asaba 2006).

firm. Who owns, who controls and to whom

New brands can be recognized differently de-

for benefit (Cook, 1995) affect market powers.

pending incumbents’ different resources. If in-

In conclusion, having market power is a key to

cumbents have similar internal resources, for

new brand’s entering strategy and it also affects

example financial condition and tangible/in-

incumbents differently based on the Expectancy-

tangible resources, it will be threat. Besides, if

Valence theory.

new brand enters common market competing

Also rarely have the researchers studied the

with same target customer, it will also be threat.

long-term effect of new brand entrance. New

In conclusion, incumbents set strategy accord-

brand entrance can be an attack in market in

ing to their status or market condition.

the short-run. But if firm’s positions are held

However, much less consider of entrant’s

constant in the long run, the Nash equilibrium

ownership. Firm's ownership affects Market

will exist (John R. Hauser, 1998). The Nash

Orientation and Performance in mixed oligopoly

equilibrium will be repeated in balance and off-

(Nett, 1990). Market Orientation is the Organizational

balance as firms’ interdependency with resources

culture that most effectively and efficiently

and environment changes. When new brand

creates the necessary behaviors for the creation

enters, the degrees of attack are different as

of superior value for buyers and, thus, continuous

how much market is overlapping and how much

superior performance for the business (Aaker

resources are similar with incumbents. Thus,

1988; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Kotler 1984;

long-term market balance will be converged as

Kotler and Andreasen 1987; Peters and Austin

interdependency of both factors and price strat-

1985; Peters and Waterman 1982; Shappiro

egy will be almost similar.

1988; Webster 1988). In other words, Market

The purpose of this research is to study in-

Orientation is the appropriate response for cur-

cumbent's responses based on the interdependency
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of internal resources and external environment

the price is volatile, gasoline market fits to an-

both short-term and long-term especially ac-

alyze market change and firm's responses. At

cording to different type of ownership. This

2011, Korean government implemented new

study bridges a gap in incumbents’ response

distribution policies and new brand entrance

about new brand entry by event study chang-

was one of those policies. Thus we can analyze

ing its time window short or long. From this

new brand entry’s effectiveness to incumbents

research, we contribute to identify how in-

whenever each firm enters its local market.

cumbents respond differently as entrants’ own-

In this article, we study incumbent's re-

ership and how firm’s price strategy changes

sponses to a new brand entry and the con-

as time goes on.

sequences of these reactions in the long-run.

Research questions are as follows.

The specific objectives are (a) to quantify how
incumbents decrease their price in reaction to

1. When new brand enters, are the price

the new brand entry; (b) to examine how these

strategies different from incumbent's in-

responses vary depending on interdependency

ternal resources?

of internal resources and external environments

2. When new brand enters, are the price

and also ownership; (c) to examine how in-

strategies different from incumbent's ex-

cumbents’ price strategy change in the long-run.

ternal environment?

We organize the rest of this article as followers:

3. If new brand's ownership is different, are
the incumbent's responses different?
4. How do the Incumbents' responses change
in the long-term?

First, We present the conceptual framework
and hypotheses. Second, we discuss the data
and methodology. Last, we present empirical
results and discuss their key implications.

The scopes of goods are extended to unexpected filed. Energy market is one of that.

Ⅰ. Conceptual Framework

In past, Energy industry was government owned,
managed and even supplied to consumer. Recently
this market has been changed to a competitive

As Expectancy-Valence theory (Atkinson,

market because consumer’s information, prefer-

1964; House, 1971: Vroom, 1964) said, firm

ence and choice to use energy are sensitive same

establishes its strategy for expected outcomes.

as other goods. Especially gasoline market is

An organization established its strategy to ach-

already perfect competition market in retail.

ieve goals. Goal is a basic motivation theory.

Because consumer purchases it very often and

Vroom suggested valence, instrumentality and
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expectancy to other motivational factors. Valence

Price and non-price strategies in gasoline mar-

is an affective orientation toward particular

ket are related with local market characteristics

outcomes and it can be basic motivation for

(Iyer and Seetharaman, 2008). When a new

firms to decide whether change or stay their

brand enters, it chooses strategies among price

strategy. Thus Expectancy-Valence theory is

and non-price strategies. Concerning that Gasoline

that firm can adjust its strategy based on their

market is price-sensitive market, price strategy

expected outcome and probability in addition

is most popular strategy and especially new

to goals. When new event occurs and it loses

entrant might choose low-end strategy. Thus

the balance of the power of market, firm de-

we analyze incumbents’ reaction to low-end

cides whether to stay or change. If firm has

price attack. When a new brand enters with

competitive internal resources, it takes com-

low-end price strategy, incumbents within same

petitively differentiate strategy. If a firm is in-

region will also decrease their price.

ferior, it changes strategy to accommodate

H 1: New brand entrance will decrease in-

market condition.
This phenomenon will frequently happen when

cumbents' price in price-sensitive market.

new brand enters market. If new event recognized as an attack to incumbents, strategies of

Organization has interdependence with its

price and marketing mix of incumbents will be

environment and the most direct method for

changed and the balance of whole market will

controlling is to control the source of that de-

be broken. Differentiated new brand’s entry

pendence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The

could be "centrality of attack", but degree of

resource-based view of the firm seems partic-

attack will be different according to incumbents'

ularly useful in differentiating competitors from

resources. Especially, if core strategy of new

a strategic point of view (Amit & Schoemaker,

entrant is overlapping with product assortment,

1993; Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992;

positioning, location or price, incumbents per-

Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994) Resource

ceive it as threats. Distinctive strategy of new

similarity is defined as the extent to which a

entrant sets the stage for increasing market share.

given competitor possesses strategic endowments

Such strategic change is consistent in gaso-

comparable, in terms of both type and amount,

line market. The variables ignite competition in

to those of the focal firm (Chen 1996). If a

gasoline market are location, additional service

competitor possesses strategic endowments com-

and brand marketing etc. Padmanabhan and

pare, in terms of both type and amount, to

Seetharman(2007) analyzed econometric model

those of the focal firm, organization has resource

of location and price in gasoline market. Also

similarity. The understanding of resource sim-
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ilarity is important for competitive advantage

capacity and Organizational capacity in Capacity

because firms with similar resource bundles are

to Withstand the Threat.

likely to have similar strategic capabilities as

In this study, we analyze that plenty of in-

well as competitive vulnerability in the marketplace.

ternal resources affects on incumbents' responses.

For example, when Wal-mart enters, Low-end

Incumbents who have much brand power and

grocery stores targeting same high-elasticity

high market share will not be affected than

consumer lower the price than stores with high

incumbents who have less brand power and low

quality and differentiate service (Basker &

market shared by new entrant. Gasoline mar-

Noel, 2009). The more resources are analogous

ket in Korea is monopoly market that only 4

with new brand, the larger incumbents' retali-

firms exist. These 4 firms have different market

atory responses. In this article, we use resource

share by brands and these market share iden-

similarity as a variable to measure incumbents'

tify with brand equity. Thus the higher in-

responses.

cumbents’ brand equities are the lower incumbents'

Most incumbents will have countervailing power

responses. Incumbents who have plenty of hu-

as retaliatory responses in accordance with new

man resources will not be affected than in-

brand's strategy (Galbraith, 1952). The stronger

cumbents who have scarce human resources.

the effect on market share of new brand's at-

Because human resources are an asset that

tack, the bigger incumbents' responses. The

produces added value, incumbents who have

existence of market power creates an incentive

scarce human resources provide limited service

to the organization of another position of power

that made by people. Thus human resources are

that neutralizes it. Super stores belonging to

variable to analyze internal resources. The more

profitable company will not response on price

human resources incumbents have, the lower

and promotion but response on assortment. But

incumbents' responses. Last, marketing mix that

EDLP store having similar position with Wal-

incumbents provide is also one of variable.

mart will not response on price but will response

Because incumbents having facilities are differ-

on promotion and assortment (Aliwadi, 2010).

entiating in positioning compared to new en-

Thus countervailing power is different with in-

trant, if incumbents provide more facilities, in-

cumbent's internal resources. When Wal-mart

cumbents will not response. Like bundle prod-

enters, the effect of entry is explained by

ucts, Car wash, Repairs and CVS are additional

Seriousness of the Threat and Capacity to

service in gasoline market. The more additional

Withstand the Threat (Gielens, 2008). The more

services incumbents have, the lower incumbents'

differentiate on assortment and positioning in

responses.

seriousness of the threat, the larger of financial
The Effect of New brand’s Entry on the Price Strategy of Incumbent Retailers 77

H 2: The more analogous to Resources with

competitors when they are in close distance,

new brand, the lager incumbents’ price

and the effect diminishes as distant. Because

decreases.

they share buying power in closer distance bands
than in distant. Price is changed as near gas

H 3: The more plentiful incumbents' internal

station's price in gasoline market (Lewis, 2008).

resources, the lager incumbents' price

As for distance and density of nearest region,

decreases.

the more market commonality, the larger in-

H 3a: The higher incumbents' brand equi-

cumbents’ retaliatory response. In this article,

ties are, the smaller incumbents' price

we use market commonality as a variable to

decreases.

measure incumbents' responses. Chan (2007)

H 3b: The more human resources incumbents

used 1-mile radius of station to measure com-

have, the smaller incumbents' price

petitiveness in gasoline retail market. Because

decreases.

Korea uses length scale as kilometers, we use

H 3c: The more additional services incumbents have, the smaller incumbents'
price decreases.

1-km radius of station to measure market
commonality.
In this article, we analyze the competitiveness of external environment' effect on in-

Another variable to incumbent’s response is

cumbents' responses. Incumbents whose market

market commonality. Market commonality is

is competitive will be affected than incumbents

the degree of presence that a competitor mani-

whose market is non-competitive. In general,

fests in the markets it overlaps with the focal

Region where market size is small is more

firm (Chen, 1996). Prior research of new brand

competitive than region where market size is

did much on spatial differentiation. Stores lo-

large. Thus the smaller incumbents' market

cated in same region have same target market

size, the larger incumbents' price decrease.

boundary. The degree of competitiveness is di-

Regions where incumbents' price level is low

minished as distance is far from target market

are more sensitive in prices than regions where

(Orhun, 2005). The variables to measure mar-

incumbents' price level is high. In general, Region

ket commonality in Gasoline market are prod-

where price level is low is more prices sensitive

uct, brand, location and services. But consumer

and competitive than region where price level

cannot distinguish product in gasoline market.

is high. The lower price level is the larger in-

Thus in retailing, most important thing to con-

cumbents' price decrease.

sider among exogenous market characteristics
is location. All firms exert a negative effect on
78 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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H 4: The higher overlapping market com-

monality with new brand, the lager in-

and firm's performance. Market orientation is

cumbents' price decreases.

the organization’s culture that most effectively
and efficiently creates the necessary behaviors

H 5: The more competitive are incumbents'

for the creation of superior value for buyers

external environment, the lager incumbents'

and, thus, continuous superior performance for

price decreases.

the business (Aaker 1988; Kohli and Jaworski

H 5a: The smaller are incumbents' market

1990; Kotler 1984; Kotler and Andreasen 1987;

size, the larger incumbents' price

Peters and Austin 1985; Peters and Waterman

decreases.

1982; Shappiro 1988; Webster 1988). In other

H 5b: The lower price levels of incumbent,

words, Market Orientation is the appropriate

the larger incumbents' price decreases.

response for current and future customer needs.
Thus Market Orientated firm may adopt its

When new brand enters, the width and depth

strategy to customer's needs to find out mar-

of incumbents’ reaction are various, according

ket opportunity and also higher firm's perform-

to exogenous market characteristics and inter-

ance and profitability. If firm's ownership is in-

dependence with internal resources and those

dependent, firm is more flexible to strategy and

environments. Retaliatory responses are differ-

price. Because firm's ownership affects Market

ent from market-specific characteristics and

Originality and also firm's performance (Narver

incumbent-specific characteristics. Also when

and Slater, 1990), Independence of firm's own-

the interdependence with focal firm is asym-

ership is positively related with Market ori-

metric, incumbents takes different strategies.

entation and Market orientation is positively

As Wal-mart's entry has had different effect

related with firm's performance.

on Target and Costco (Ailawadi at al, 2010),

In mixed oligopoly, public and private owner-

incumbents have different strategy based on

ship will affect market orientation and firm's

their own internal resource.

performance (Nett, 1990). Private firm is most

When we consider interdependence with fo-

market oriented and public firm is least market

cal firm, we have to examine the type of focal

oriented. This assumes that private firm's pur-

firm. There are several type of Focal firms.

pose is profit maximization and public firm's

One is Private firm that maximize its profit,

purpose is increase social surplus. Cournot-type

another is Cooperation that maximize member's

simultaneous move game or Stackerlberg-type

benefit and the others is Public firm that

sequential move in mixed oligopoly has differ-

maximize social surplus. To look up firm's type,

ent result as for which firm is a market leader.

we consider the relationship of Market orientation

When private firm is a market leader, social

The Effect of New brand’s Entry on the Price Strategy of Incumbent Retailers 79

surplus and consumer surplus is increased (Hiroaki

ownership and it is progressed as entrepreneurial

and Toshihiro, 2010). Public firm's marginal cost

cooperation. Entrepreneurial cooperative firm adds

is higher than private firm because pays higher

to the market orientation and performance of

information sharing cost. Also public firm has

the cooperative firm (Kyriakos at all 2004). Thus

low performance because public firm is safe in

re-engineered cooperative firm is an intermediate

bankruptcy and M&A and doesn't need to

form of private and public. When cooperative

lower cost and raise its competitiveness. When

new brand enters, the more highly overlapping

public firm is a market leader, private firm re-

it is in resource similarity, the larger incumbents’

gards it as reference price and never lower its

price decreases.

cost and price. This result has different result
when ownership interacts with location. Showing

H 6: Different type of ownership will have

up different type of ownership is not affect to

different effect on incumbents’ responses

market, it only affect when ownership interacts

H 6a: When private new brand enters, the

with location (Raphael 2005). When public new

more highly overlapping in resource

brand enters in mixed oligopoly, the more highly

similarity and market commonality,

overlapping it is in market commonality, the

the larger prices incumbents’ decreases.

lager incumbents’ price decreases.

H 6b: When cooperative new brand enters,

Strategic differences exist also if ownership is

the more highly overlapping in re-

cooperation type. Cooperation is for user-owner,

source similarity, the larger prices

user-control and user-benefit (Cook, 1995).

incumbents’ decreases.

Traditional cooperation has function that it buys

H 6c: When public new brand enters, the

goods from members for best price and sells

more highly overlapping in market

goods to customers for a reasonable price. Because

commonality, the larger prices in-

cooperation is operated not for owner but for

cumbents’ decreases.

all members, the optimization of resource allocation, investment and managerial regulation is
similar to public firm. On the other hand, co-

Ⅱ. Model and Data

operation has something in common in that it
maximizes profit, but the difference is not for
the owner, but for the members. Recently reengineered cooperation was innovated in managerial regulation. Re-engineered cooperation encouraged involving non-members in control and
80 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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2.1 Conceptual Model

<Figure 1> Conceptual Framework

and 1 self-brand, covering the control and esti-

2.2 Data

mation period from Nov 1st 2010 to 150 days
Korean government announced to introduction

after each new brand entry.

of new brand in retail oil market in summer

The data are provided by Korea National Oil

2011. New brand will be about 5% cheaper

Corporation (KNOC). KNOC gather, analyze

than incumbents. It reduces distribution cost

and offer oil price based on Korean Petroleum

and supplies lower price. Korean governments

Business Act. KNOC operates Oil Price in-

gave incentives to new entry and encourage

formation Network (www.opinet.co.kr) and of-

changing. Government bids wholesale price to

fers informations of oil market in diverse format.

supply lower price and also subsidizes expenses

KNOC gets price information from credit VAN

to settle down. First gas station of new brand

(value added network) company automatically

opened at Nov 29th 2011. We analyze 950 new

and prices are updated 6 times a day. We use

brand entries that occurred during Nov 2011 to

average price of a day to use analysis.

April 2013. The first one opening is Nov 29th
2011 and the last one is March 1st 2013. We

2.2.1 Sample selection and composition

use daily store price data of 11,856 experimental
and control stores belonging to four retail chains

We used market information from KNOC and

The Effect of New brand’s Entry on the Price Strategy of Incumbent Retailers 81

store opening information from Ministry of Trade,

petrochemical company each. They have same

Industry and Energy. First we divided each

brand wholesale suppliers and credit card dis-

city by administrative district assuming that

count policy. Because these 4 chains have brand

gas station price is different to city. We se-

power and market share, they have similar po-

lected all stores that (1) reported retail activities,

sitioning though it can be different across re-

(2) there was no existing New brand entry within

gion and situation. But 1 self-brand is independent

a 1-kilometers of the new brand or not and

owner. Because it has no vertical relationship

(3) did not previously have a new brand with-

with petrochemical company and no brand power,

in a 1-kilometers radius or if they had a pre-

it has low-end price strategy. The sample com-

existing new brand, it had opened more than

prised 1,634 self-brand stores and 38,031 brand

quarters before. Next we eliminated stores that

stores including changing retail shop owner.

switched brand and shut down in control period.
We further eliminated retail stores whose re-

Plentiful of Internal Resources. Having more

gion had no opining new brand. And also we

resources means that incumbents will stay rather

match stores according to new brand's owner-

than response. Brand equity reflects the de-

ships: Private, cooperatives and Public.

grees how much the incumbent's market shares
are. Human resources reflects value-added that

2.2.2 Operationalization of the Measures

employer creates. Other marketing variables
capture whether the incumbents provide addi-

We study reaction by internal resources and

tional services.

outside environment.

Market Commonality. Overlap in market comAbnormal Price. We used daily selling prices

monality reflects the extent to how much in-

from Opinet to calculate the observed actual

cumbents share target market with new brand.

prices Pit. For Pmt, we used the daily interna-

Because Korean government abolished limited

tional oil market indexes which is Singapore

distance of each gas station at 1997, there are

92RON petroleum price calculated by exchanged

sufficient competitions in oil market. The sam-

rate as reported.

ple comprised 5235 "experimental" stores from
5 chains which exist within 1km radius of new

Resource Similarity. Overlap in resource sim-

brand entries and 34,420 "control" stores which

ilarity reflects the extent to how much the

exist outside 1km radius of new brand entries.

critical resources are similar with new brand.
Preexisting 4 retail chains are belonging to

82 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL
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Competitiveness of external environment.

Competitive market means that incumbents

region, the less competitive the market is.

will response rather than stay. Market size re-

<Table 1> presents descriptive statistics of

flects the extents to which markets, in which

Gasoline market in Korea used in the empirical

an incumbent retailer meets new brand, are

study. We also did multicollinearity test of

more customers. The more customers in the mar-

each variables. In our case, the absolute value

ket, the less competitive the market is. Price

of all correlations is below 0.65 thus there is no

range reflects the extents to which markets are

multicollinearity problem.

more price sensitive. The higher price in the
<Table 1> Descriptive Statistics of Gasoline market in Korea Market share
Brand

%

SK Energy

32.46

GS Cartex

23.29

Hyundai Oilbank

18.20

S-oil

15.42

self brand

3.86

Private New brand

2.71

cooperative New brand

2.97

Public New brand

1.15
Management type

Store type

%

Brand retail store

7.5

Independent store

92.5
Adjacent to New brand

Distance

%

1km radius

13.2

3km radius

30.79
Additional Service

Service

%

Self Service

9.25

Car Wash

28.9

Repair Service

8.52

CVS

7.28
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3.2 Second-Stage Analysis: Event Studies

Ⅲ. Methodology

We use an event study to calculate the ab-

3.1 First-Stage Analysis: Estimating
variables for retail price

normal price for incumbents as a result of new
brand entry. We calculate these abnormal prices over a time window centered on the open-

Prior to analyze new brand effect to incumbent,

ing day of the new brand. Next we estimate

we analyze how retail price of gasoline market

regression models of abnormal prices cross-sec-

is first. The variables which affect retail price

tion to interdependence with internal resources

are composed three dimensions: cost, com-

and external market environment. And also we

petitiveness and demand. We estimate the fol-

estimate a regression model for each store- and

lowing model for each store in Seoul.

market-characteristics across entry's ownership
category.

Pi = b0 + b1Xi + b2Yi +b3Zi +ei

(1)

3.2.1 Event studies
Xi is the vector that represents cost. Cost vector
has several variables like brand type, manage-

Abnormal Return methodology is widely used

ment type, land price, the number of pump,

in Economics and Financing to measure event’s

Car wash, Repair and CVS. Yi is the vector

impact. The abnormal return is the difference

that represents competitiveness. Competitiveness

between the actual ex post return of the se-

vector has several variables like the number of

curity over the event windows and the normal

gasoline station within 1km radius, distance to

return of the firm over the event windows.

other gasoline station, adjacent to new brand

Because we observe price change after event,

within 1km radius and adjacent to self-brand

we regard new brand store’s open day as an

within 1km radius. Zi is the vector that repre-

event day and examine incumbent's price change

sents demand. Demand vector has several vari-

before and after event. We have an assump-

ables like the number of company in that re-

tion that oil market is fully competitive and the

gion, the number of car in that region and Road

information is shared to all other stores. Under

type where the gas station is located. And ei is

this assumption, the market price of the store

a vector of residuals of that model.

changes immediately and unbiasedly for new
information. When new information is disseminated, Firms reflect this event information
thus strategy and performance is changed im-
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mediately (Brown and Warner, 1995).

The event day abnormal price Pi0 is then as-

In Abnormal Price model, the observed price

sessed for statistical significance relative to the

Pit on the event day is compared with E(Pit)

distribution of abnormal price APit in the con-

which is expected price if the event had not

trol period

occur. As for Brown and Warner's(1985) ap-

To capture effect as time goes on, we ag-

proach, we use the market price to obtain esti-

gregate the abnormal prices for a store over

mates of retailer's expected prices.

the “event period” [t0, t7] into a cumulative
abnormal price (CAP).

Pit = αi + βiPmt + eit

(2)

E(Pit) = αi + βiPmt

(3)

CAPi[-t1, t2] = ∑ eit

(4)

CAAPi[-t1, t2] = ∑ CAPi[-t1, t2]/K

(5)

Where Pit and Pmt denote the price on day t
for i stores and market price on day t, re-

where t=0 on the event day. Because we

spectively, eit represents a store-specific price,

conducted the event study across K different

and the parameters σ, β specify the linear

stores, this CAP can be averaged into a cumu-

structure of the market model. By the assump-

lative abnormal price(CAAP);

tions of the market model, the store-specific

We assess the significance of the AAP

price of i store eit is not related to the overall

through patell’s (1976) t-statistics. This sta-

market thus has a zero expected value.

tistic reduces the effect of large price standard

Adjusting the observed event date price for

deviation. The effect of new event is determined

store i by subtracting the expected return rep-

on the basis of the significance of respective

resents an abnormal price for store I.

daily average abnormal price(AAP) terms on
the days surrounding the event day.

APi0=eit=Pi0–E(Pi0)=Pi0–(αi+βiPm0)
APit=eit=Pit–E(Pit)=Pit–(αi+βiPmt)

3.2.2 Test of Moderator Effects

For comparison and to determine statistical

We test our Hypotheses on the differential

significance, the market model parameters σ

effect of New brand entry on incumbent stores

and β are obtained by an ordinary least-squares

through a cross sectional regression on the ab-

regression of each store price Pi on market

normal prices:

price Pm over the control period. The control
period contains beginning 400 days before of
event and ending 8 days before the event day.

CAAPi[-t1, t2] = β0 + β1RSi + β2MCi
+ β3BEi + β4HRi + β5CWi
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+ β6Repairi + β7CVSi + β8Pregioni

store has different cost, customer and also market

+ β9Cari

size according to location. Inversely, each store

(6)

has different sales quantity or performance though
Where RS denotes Resource Similarity and

they set a same price. Thus location and land

MC denotes Market Commonality. BE, HR,

price means locational position and even more

CW, Repair and CVS denote the plenty of

it includes opportunity cost. Land price is dif-

internal resources in Brand Equity, Human

ferent depending on brand and management

Resource, Car Wash, Repair and Convenience

type. Company branch stores are most expensive.

Store respectively. Pregion and Car indicate

Company branch’s land price is $6000 per m2,

the competitiveness of external environment in

Agency branch’s land price is $5700 m2and

Price region and the number of car in that

Independent store’s land price is $4900 per m2.

region. We use CAAPi as the dependent vari-

Also high market share companies are higher

able to compare the effect between short-term

land price. It means starting branch stores are

and long-term.

located in better condition than independent
stores. New brand and self-brand store’s land
price is about 65% and 75% of average store’s

Ⅳ. Empirical Analysis

land price of Seoul. And 84% of gasoline stations are located in main street. Each store’s
additional services could also affect to selling

4.1 First-Stage Analysis: Estimating
for retail price

price. Stores which have Car Wash are 59%,
repair are 32% and CVS are 13% in Seoul. Stores
have 12 pumps in average and self –service

Prior to analyze new brand effect to incumbent,

stations are more in SK Energy and GS Caltex

we analyze how retail price of gasoline market

brand. For competitiveness variable, all of gas

is first. To capture the variables composed re-

stations except only 4 stations are located ad-

tail gasoline store’s entire price, we analyze 642

jacent to other gas stations within 1 kilometer

gasoline stores in Seoul. <Table 2> represents

radius. Gasoline station has 4.7 stations within

Descriptive Statistics of Gasoline market in Seoul.

1km radius on average and average distance to

We can see market share of each brand in

most adjacent gas station is 404 meter. Gas

Seoul at April 2013. SK Energy is 40.9%, GS

stations that are located adjacent to new brand

Caltex is 29.9%, Hyundai oilbank is 13.9% and

within 1 kilometer radius are 42 and to self-brand

S-oil is 10.7%. Location is one of the most im-

within 1 kilometer radius is 66.

portant variables to decide store’s price. Each
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We gathered data 7 times on April 1st, 6th,

<Table 2> Descriptive Statistics of Gasoline market in Seoul
Market share and Management type
Company branch

Agency branch

Independent

total

SK Energy

77

35

149

261

GS Caltex

72

44

75

191

Hyundai oilbank

36

0

53

89

S-oil

14

2

52

68

New Brand

0

0

13

13

Private Brand

0

0

20

20

Land Price

(Won/m2)

Company branch

Agency branch

Independent

Average

SK Energy

6,221,240

5,723,929

5,527,905

5,824,358

GS Caltex

6,397,843

6,111,475

5,625,934

6,045,084

Hyundai oilbank

6,160,000

0

5,280,508

5,570,341

S-oil

5,459,587

5,465,000

5,284,077

5,462,088

New brand

0

0

3,657,143

3,657,143

Self-brand

0

0

3,995,625

3,995,625

Location
Road type

%

road with 50-70m width

15.82

road with 30-50m width

23.06

road with 12-30m width

8.40

road under 12m width

13.02

intersection with main road

61.29
Additional Service

Car Wash

Repair

CVS

count

360

164

79

Percent

58.82

32.03

12.91

Self-service and pump
SK Energy

GS Caltex

Hyundai oilbank

S-oil

new brand

self-brand

Self

28

24

6

2

0

0

Pump

14

13

12

12

12

9
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<Table 2> Descriptive Statistics of Gasoline market in Seoul (continue)
Competitiveness with minority store
Count
near with new brand

42

near with self-brand

66
Competitiveness
Count

Gasoline station within 1kim radius

4.72

Distance to other gasoline station
meter
Distance to other gasoline station

404.9835
Regional Characteristics
Count

CAR

105264

company

30925

11th, 16th, 21th, 26th and 29th and regressed it
st

trary, the more company in that region, the

using April 1 and average price of April as

higher the price is. The number of car means

dependent variable with Ordinary Least Squares.

how the market is competitive and the number

First, we did regression with all variables.

of company means how higher the economic

For cost variables, the higher the land price,

condition in that region. From that result, we

the higher the price is. Self-service store’s price

know selling price of gasoline is different with

is cheaper. And stores with Car wash service

regional characteristics. If we control influence

are more expensive. For competitiveness varia-

of regional difference, we can get more accu-

bles, the more the number of stores within I

rate results. But the number of cars and the

kilometers radius, the lower the price is. And

number of company can cause multicolliniarity.

stores which is located within 1 kilometers ra-

We test correlation coefficient, but there was

dius of new brand sells cheaper price. For de-

no multicollinearity. In conclusion, gasoline sta-

mand variables, the closer with the main load,

tion’s price is mostly affected by competitive-

the higher the price is. The more cars in that

ness variables among cost, competitiveness and

region, the lower the price are. On the con-

demand.
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4.2 Selection of variables and analyzing
the effect

with variables selected with stepwise regression.
The result is as follows: Brand and market
share affects selling price. SK Energy station is

To select meaningful variables among cost,

expensive 7.6 cents more, GS Caltex is expensive

competitiveness and demand, we select varia-

5.6 cents more and self-brand is cheaper 4

bles by forward stepwise regression. In cost

cents less. Whenever the width of land is in-

variables, SK Energy, GS Caltex, self-brand,

creased by 10 times from 10m2, the price goes

log of land price, self-service, Car Wash and

up by9.7 cents more. The reason we take log

CVS are selected. In competitiveness variables,

land price instead of land price is that the land

the number of adjacent stores within 1kilometer

price cannot increased infinitely as the width

radius and store within 1 kilometers of new

of land is increased. The gasoline station with

brand are selected. In demand variables, the

car wash takes higher selling price and the

number of company, the number of cars and

station with repair takes lower selling price.

location are selected.

Because customer uses car wash very often

<Table 3> represents the result of regression

and the stations provide car wash service like

<Table 3> Result of regression with variables selected by Stepwise
Price of April 1st 2013
Variables

Parameter Estimate

t Value

Intercept

1313.9

11.37***

SK

75.53

8.55***
5.57***

GS

52.81

Hyundai

8.02

0.74

S-oil

11.38

0.59

self brand

-40.77

-2.78**

Self

-90.65

-7.48***

Wash

18.56

2.52**

Llandprice

97.09

5.37***

road with 30-50m width

14.62

2.35**

competitiveness

-6.82

-4.3***

-30

-2.34**

CAR

-0.43

-3.68**

company

0.003

Adj with new brand

N=597

8.36***

2

R =0.57

***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05
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a bundle product with refuel as discounted

region, the higher the price is.

price, the gasoline stations with car wash have
incentives to set higher price for refuel. But

4.3 Second-Stage Analysis: Event study

repair service, to attract customer to use repair
service, the gasoline stations with repair service

<Figure 2> represents price change of 15 days

set lower price and promote that service. CVS

surrounding event. New store open is not same

is not affect to selling price of gasoline station.

as event announcement and incumbent may

It means CVS is independent with gasoline

react in advance. Though time window we use

station in profit structure. The more the num-

in analysis is [-t7, t7], we look up price change

ber of stations within 1kilometer radius, the

surrounding 15 days of event. As we expected,

lower the price is as 0.7 cents. And if gas sta-

incumbent stores lower the price after event

tion is located within 1 kilometer radius of new

occur. Incumbent responses 7 days prior to event

brand, selling price of that station is cheaper 3

day and comes back to normal 7 days after

cents less. Adjacent to other gas station espe-

the event. <Figure 3> shows incumbent’s re-

cially new brand is important to lower the price.

sponse for different levels of resource similarity

The effect of new brand will be analyzed in

and market commonality. Incumbents with high

second stage. Also accessibility is important

resource similarity stay before event occurs and

factors to influence selling price. The gas sta-

lower the price right before the event. In the other

tion located in main road is cheaper 1.5 cent

hand, Incumbents with high market common-

more. The more the number of company in that

ality lower the price 7days before the event.

<Figure 2> Abnormal Price of retail gasoline station
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<Figure 3> Price change by Market Commonality & Resource Similarity
RS High MC High

RS Low MC High

RS High MC Low

RS Low MC Low

<Table 4> presents information on daily

by surprise in short window.

AAPs for 39,661 retail incumbents for a win-

Petroleum is similar by company and cus-

dow of 14 business days around the event day.

tomer cannot distinguish that. Thus incumbents

On day t-1, the incumbent retailers experienced

will lower the price to protect market share for

an average negative abnormal price of 0.36

new brand enter. H1 pertains to the incumbents

Korean won, which is significant (p < 0.001).

caused by new brand entry. We find strong

On the opening day, they experienced price cut

support for new bran entry’s anticipated neg-

an average 0.38 Korean won, which is significant

ative effect on incumbent price strategy.

(p < 0.001). The total average effect over Days

We find that incumbent’s overall negative

-7 and 7 is significant. As such, our results

price for CAAR[-7, 7]. More notable is the

means a formal response in price for event oc-

variation in CARi[0, 7] across individual retailers.

cur and the move took all market participants

Although <Table 4> shows that most of in-
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<Table 4> Average daily Abnormal Price
Day

Average Abnormal Price

Patell t-Statistics

t-7

0.8593

27.10***

t-6

0.9569

27.13***

t-5

1.1041

27.73***

t-4

0.6409

25.43***

t-3

0.3418

23.87***

t-2

0.0259

22.35***

t-1

-0.4811

20.07***

t

-0.8564

18.25***

t+1

-0.8653

17.25***

t+2

-0.8112

17.99***

t+3

-0.8676

17.44***

t+4

-1.2882

15.48***

t+5

-1.5993

13.98***

t+6

-1.8435

12.71***

t+7

-1.7964

12.78***

cumbent responses for event, those collective

more analogous to Resources with new brand,

result cannot evaluate the entry of new brand

the lager incumbents’ price decreases. Also the

as a unitary phenomenon, affecting all incumbent

more highly overlapping market commonality is

retailers equally. To understand these differ-

with new brand, the lager incumbents' price

entials for individual retailers, we estimated

decreases. Especially Resource similarity have

equation 6 with the individual retailer’s CAAR

more effect on incumbent’s retaliatory responses.

[0,7] as dependent variable for short-term effect.

Because the incumbents who has similar re-

<Table 5> presents the results.

source with new brand has same target customer who is more sensitive to price, its cross

4.3.1 Resource similarity and Market
commonality

price elasticity with new brand is more sensitive.

4.3.2 Plenty of Internal resource
H2 and H4 pertain to resource similarity and
market commonality of incumbent caused by

H3 pertains to the plentiful of internal re-

new brand entry as the driver of incumbent’s

source as the driver of incumbent’s expected

expected response. We find strong support for

response. The effect of brand equity, H3a, is

incumbents’ price cut on new brand entry. The

not supported. However, Human resources that
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<Table 5> Short-term effect of New brand entry

Variable

Cumulative Average Abnormal Price[0,7]
Expected Sign
b
Std

Intercept

6.81

0.91

|t|
7.45***

Resource Similarity

-

-3.42

1.35

-2.54**

Market Commonality

-

-1.98

0.81

-2.43**

Brand equity

+

0.04

0.21

0.18

Self

-

-3.12

0.90

-3.49**

Wash

+

0.99

0.58

1.70

Repair

+

-2.65

0.98

-2.71**

CVS

+

0.95

0.95

Pregion

-

-3.19

0.46

-6.99***

Car

+

0.02

0.00

6.99***

N=389577

1.00

R2=0.33

***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05

create added value matter. The price of incumbent retailers that have more human re-

4.3.3 Competitiveness of external
environment

sources was less negatively affected than fewer
retailers. The smaller incumbents' price decreases.

Generally, the price is different according to

The more additional services incumbents have

region because customer’s income and the

the smaller incumbents' price decreases. For

standard of living by region. Specially, there

additional services (H3c), the incumbent re-

are big differences in gasoline market. To cap-

tailers with additional services will be less neg-

ture price difference and the trend of price

atively affected. But the result is different ac-

change by region, we divided whole market

cording what the services are. Incumbents with

into three regions by clustering analysis. Price

Car Wash and CVS were not affected. Repair

Region 3 is most expensive and most asym-

was the factor that responses adversely. It was

metric with index. Price Region2 is similar with

the same result in first stage that we analyzed

average price. Price Region 1 is low price zone

the price structure of gasoline station. Repair

and response instantly. We expected that the

service is not a bundle product to provide with

region with high price policy will not be affected

refuels, because of seldom use and CVS is in-

by new brand entry because of low competitiveness.

dependent with profit structure.

But the result has opposite direction. The in-
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cumbent retailers took high price is more flexi-

ferential responses. When private firm enters,

ble to price strategy because their profitability

both resource similarity and market common-

is high. Thus when new brand enters, they re-

ality are affecting to incumbents as we expected.

duce their price temporarily to protect market

When there are interaction with resource sim-

share but this effect will not last long. Hypothesis

ilarity and market commonality, the effect is

H5b, the smaller incumbents' market size are,

greater. Also the plenty of internal resources

the larger incumbents' price decreases, is supported.

and competitiveness of external environment al-

If the numbers of cars are increased, market

so affect to incumbents’ responses. When new

size will also increase. The region where market

brand is Cooperative firm, only Resource sim-

size is large is less competitive and there was

ilarity has effect to incumbents’ responses in

no cause to lower the price.

Model 1. But when there is interaction with
resource similarity and market commonality,

4.3.4 New brand’s ownership effect to
incumbent’s price strategy

resource similarity is not significant. It means
resource similarity is affected when it is located within common market with new brand.

We analyzed incumbent’s response according

Cooperative firm enters in rural area, additional

to new brand’s ownership. New brand’s owner-

services are not so many. Thus the plenty of

ship means how individual retailer control their

additional resources has only effect when in-

price. We measure the ownership as three

cumbents have Car wash. Competitiveness of

types: private firm, cooperative firm and pub-

external environment is significant. When pub-

lic firm. The ownership is related to set price

lic new brand enters, both resource similarity

independently. Private firm set and control its

and market commonality have effect to in-

price independently. Cooperative firm that max-

cumbents’ responses in Model 1. But if there is

imize member’s profit set and control its price

interaction effect, resource similarity is not

by members. Public firm that maximize social

significant. In other words, resource similarity

surplus set and control its price by government

is omitted variable bias. Public new brand used

to adjust social benefit.

in this analysis, gasoline station located in ex-

<Table 6> represents analyzing result for in-

press way. Thus incumbents near public new

cumbents’ responses according to new brand’s

brand are located remote and the plenty of in-

ownership. Model 1 has no interaction with

ternal resources are not affected to selling price.

Market Commonality and Resource Similarity

Same with other ownerships, competitiveness

and Model 2 has. H6 highlights the importance

of external environment is significant.

for new brands’ ownership to incumbents’ dif-
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<Table 7> represents long-term effect of new

<Table 6> Short-term effect analysis
Cumulative Average Abnormal Price[0,7]
Private
Model 1
b

Coop
Model 2

t

b

Model 1

t

b

Model 2

t

b

Intercept

11.70 10.96**

11.75 11.00*** -5.36

-4.82***

MC

-2.20 -2.04*

-1.67 -2.25*

0.83

0.71

RS

-4.55 -2.66***

-3.13 -2.32*

-3.89

MC*RS
Self
Wash
Repair
CVS
Pregion
Car

3.48**

-3.86 -2.96**
-2.89 -2.44*
1.48

1.48

-2.68 -2.04*
1.39

1.86

-2.69 -2.04*

1.04

1.39

-4.33 -6.64***
0.02

-2.89 -2.44**

1.86

0.01

t

b

Model 2

t

b

9.90***

t

-5.36

-4.82**

15.86

15.84

0.77

0.62

-26.79

-2.64**

-5.94

-2.63**

-0.68

0.31

-3.26

-2.53**

-4.00

-1.06

-3.74

-3.18**

-23.12

9.89***

-3.49**

-2.72**

-3.95

-2.72**

-3.83

-1.57

-3.72

-1.53

3.29

3.62**

3.29

3.62**

0.95

0.66

0.95

0.66

-2.27 -1.48

1.04

Model 1

-3.95

0.03

-4.34 -6.66*** -2.01

4.63***

EX

-2.28

-1.48

-2.25

-0.88

-2.30

-0.90

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.42

0.18

0.42

0.18

-2.90**

-2.01

4.64*** -0.04 -11.22***

-2.90** -11.72 -11.08***

-0.04 -11.22***

0.13

-11.64 -11.00***

16.41***

0.13

16.44***

N=21972

N=21972

N=9929

N=9929

N=7164

N=7164

R2=0.39

R2=0.39

R2=0.25

R2=0.25

R2=0.34

R2=0.34

***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05

<Table 7> Long-term Effect Analysis
Cumulative Average Abnormal Price[121,150]
Private
Model 1
b
Intercept

t

Coop
Model 2

b

Model 1

t

b

-25.66 -15.52*** -25.73 -15.55***

MC

-0.52

-0.20*

-0.96

-0.32*

RS

-3.40

-2.14**

-5.74

-0.97*

-2.85

-2.54**

-2.59

-1.42

MC*RS
Self

-2.59

-1.42

Wash

0.86

0.71

0.86

0.71

2.72

1.37

2.72

1.37

CVS

-3.12

-1.54

-3.12

-1.54

Pregion

-4.21

-4.23**

-4.22

-4,24**

Car

0.05

0.05

t

b

t

73.52 31.12***

-3.31 -1.33

-3.99 -1.53

-14.79 -3.77*** -12.68 -2.75**

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
b

t

-14.46 -8.90***
-2.66 -2.77**
1.18

0.37

-7.54 -0.87
2.36
6.67

b

t

-14.44 -8.89***
-2.43 -2.37**
-0.81 -0.22
7.71

1.08

-5.65*** -17.30 -5.65***

-3.79 -1.52

-3.77 -1.51

1.22

-0.30 -0.20

-0.29 -0.20

-4.79 -1.48

8.34***

Model 2

73.55 31.13***

-17.27.

Repair

8.35***

EX

2.24*

2.36

1.22

-4.76 -1.47
6.67

2.24*

4.71

1.81

4.70

1.80

0.99

0.43

0.97

0.42

-0.39 -0.26

-0.40 -0.27

-1.98 -1.84

-1.97 -1.83

-0.19 -24.28***

-0.19 -24.29***

0.13 15.60***

0.13 15.60***

N=17345

N=17345

N=9230

N=9230

N=6724

N=6724

R2=0.41

R2=0.42

R2=0.47

R2=0.47

R2=0.38

R2=0.39

***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05
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brand’s ownership to incumbent’s price. As we

adjacent stores within 1kilometer radius and

explained, we use time window CAAP[121, 150]

store within 1 kilometers of new brand are

to examine long-term effect. After quarter of

selected. In demand variables, the number of

the year of new brand enter, incumbents near

company, the number of cars and location are

private new brand response constantly. Incumbents

selected. The regression result represents that

highly overlapping in resource similarity and

gasoline station located in adjacent to new brand

market commonality with private new brand

lower its price about 30 Korean won more.

lower their prices. Also competitiveness of ex-

From that result, we can assure new brand’s

ternal environment is influence factors. After

effect to incumbents. When we analyzed new

quarter of the year of cooperative new brand

brand entry by abnormal price, we can find

enter, incumbents only highly overlapping in

instant responses. On day t-1 and on the opening

resource similarity with cooperative new brand

day, incumbents experienced price cut, which

lower their prices. After quarter of the year of

is significance (p < 0.001). As such, our results

public new brand enter, incumbents only highly

means a formal response in price for event oc-

overlapping in market commonality with public

cur and the move took all market participants

new brand lower their prices. The influences of

by surprise in short window. Also we find strong

other variables wore off as time goes by.

support for incumbents’ price cut on new brand
entry. The more analogous to Resources with
new brand, the lager incumbents’ price decreases.

Ⅴ. Discussion

Also the more highly overlapping market commonality is with new brand, the lager incumbents'
price decreases. Especially Resource similarity

We analyzed incumbents’ responses as the

has larger effect on incumbent’s retaliatory

degrees of resource similarity and market

responses. Because the incumbents who has sim-

commonality. In addition to short-term re-

ilar resource with new brand has same target

sponse for “Centrality of attack”, we also how

customer who is more sensitive to price, its cross

long-term effect for attack will be convergence

price elasticity with new brand is more sensitive.

and balanced.

H3 pertains to the plentiful of internal re-

First, we analyzed which factors affect retail

source as the driver of incumbent’s expected

gasoline station’s price. In cost variables, SK

response. The effect of brand equity, H3a, is

Energy, GS Caltex, self-brand, log of land price,

not supported. However human resources that

self-service, Car Wash and CVS are selected.

create added value matter. The price of in-

In competitiveness variables, the number of

cumbent retailers that have more human re-
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sources was less negatively affected than fewer

resource similarity and market commonality are

retailers. The smaller incumbents' price decreases.

affecting to incumbents as we expected. When

The more additional services incumbents have

there are interaction with resource similarity

the smaller incumbents' price decreases. For

and market commonality, the effect is greater.

additional services (H3c), the incumbent re-

Also the plenty of internal resources and com-

tailers with additional services will be less neg-

petitiveness of external environment also affect

atively affected. But the result is different ac-

to incumbents’ responses. When new brand is

cording what the services are. Incumbents with

Cooperative firm, only Resource similarity has

Car Wash and CVS were not affected. Repair

effect to incumbents’ responses in Model 1.

was the factor that responses adversely. Repair

But when there is interaction with resource

service is not a bundle product to provide with

similarity and market commonality, resource

refuels, because of seldom use and CVS is in-

similarity is not significant. It means resource

dependent with profit structure.

similarity is affected when it is located within

We expected that the region with high price

common market with new brand. Cooperative

policy will not be affected by new brand entry

firm enters in rural area mainly; additional

because of low competitiveness. But the result

services are not so many. Thus the plenty of

has opposite direction in short term. The in-

additional resources has only effect when in-

cumbent retailers took high price is more flexi-

cumbents have Car wash. Competitiveness of

ble to price strategy because their profitability

external environment is significant. When pub-

is high. Thus when new brand enters, they re-

lic new brand enters, both resource similarity

duce their price temporarily to protect market

and market commonality have effect to in-

share but this effect will be adverse in long-

cumbents’ responses in Model 1. But if there is

term as we expected except Private brand

interaction effect, resource similarity is not

enters. The smaller incumbents' market size

significant. In other words, resource similarity

are, the larger incumbents' price decreases, is

is omitted variable bias. Public new brand used

supported. If the number of cars is increased,

in this analysis, gasoline station located in ex-

market size will also increase. The region where

press way. Thus incumbents near public new

market size is large is less competitive and there

brand are located remote and the plenty of in-

was no cause to lower the price.

ternal resources are not affected to selling price.

Lastly, we analyzed incumbent’s response according to new brand’s ownership. New brand’s

Same with other ownerships, competitiveness
of external environment is significant.

ownership means how individual retailer con-

When new brand enters and it will be an

trols their price. When private firm enters, both

“attack” to market, instant responses of in-
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cumbents are various. However only incumbents

ket or has products and service with low-level

with direct competitiveness response those “attack”

resource similarity might not suffer from loss

in the long-term. Market participants’ com-

even if they stick to the existing their own

petitiveness fades away and makes market

price strategy. Incumbents might be forced to

balance in the long run.

react to new brands with lowering their price
at first time when the new brands with high
level market commonality and resource similarity

Ⅵ. Managerial Implication

enter into the market. However, they will be
able to retain their market share with differentiated non-price competition in the long term,

The result of the data analysis above showed
that entrance of a newly launched brand would

because the price gap would get to be constant
in the long run.

affect most of all the participants that have
been doing their business in the market. Degree
of affection might differ in a short time period.
However, in the long term it is concluded that

Ⅶ. Limitation and Further
Research

affection would be confined to two types of
existing players; one is a group that has similar internal resource, the other is the one with

Limitations can be found in our research. First

an external business environment. When it comes

of all, we have generalized the analysis of the

to strength of effectiveness, the closer incumbents

Korean petroleum distribution market. Petroleum

were located to the consumers who were very

market is where resource similarity is very

sensitive to price, the stronger the effectiveness

high and location is an important factor to de-

was. In addition, the more competitive the

termine market commonality. In this sense, there

market was, the stronger the existing partic-

is room for the further research on whether

ipant was affected. So in terms of a counter-

my generalization would be applicable to the

action strategy of incumbents which have high-

other industrial markets which can be defined

level of market commonality and resource sim-

with the two criteria; resource similarity and

ilarity should lower the price as much as possi-

market commonality.

ble in order to minimize loss from encroaching

Secondly, this research has focused on the
influence on the market mainly from price

on the market share.
On the contrary, the ones that enjoy the mo-

strategy, especially low price one. In the field,

nopolistic status from their own separate mar-

customers tend to take the price into account
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as top priority to decide which gas stations

trap: Wal-Mart's effect on retail prices,”

they go. Other than price, they consider a va-

Journal of Urban Economics, 58(2), 203-229

riety of factors such as location, promotion by

Basker, Emek and Noel, Michael (2009) “The

using credit cards, the flow of driving, etc. So,

Evolving Food Chain: Competitive Effects

we can rely on a further study with consider-

of Wal-Mart’s Entry into the Supermarket

ing more variables that might be effective to

Industry,” Journal of Economics and Ma-

the result by upgrading an analyzing research

nagement Strategy, 18(4), 977-1009

model.

Baum, J. A. C., and Haveman, H. A (1997),

Lastly, the price of petroleum in most of all

“Love thy neighbor? Differentiation and

countries is in sync with the one in the inter-

agglomeration in the Manhattan hotel in-

national market. Owing to the synchronized

dustry, Administrative Science Quarterly,

price, price asymmetry can be found when price

42, 304-338

goes up and down. In the event analysis of

Bharati, Rakesh, Crain, Susan J. and Kaminski,

this research, time series were controlled in or-

Vincent (2012), “Clustering in Crude Oil

der to consider this price asymmetry. Nevertheless,

Price and the Target Pricing Zone Hypo-

the asymmetry needs to be taken into account

thesis,” Energy Economics, 34(2012), 1115-

more in further researches to make them more

1123

elaborate.

Breslaw, Jon A. and Smith, J. Barry (1995),
<Received May 29. 2014>

“A simple and efficient method for esti-

<Revised October 12. 2015>

mating the magnitude and precision of

<Accepted November 2. 2015>

selfare changes,” Journal of Applied Eco-

nometrics, 10, 313-327
Breslaw, Jon A. and Smith, J. Barry (1995),
“Measuring Welfare Changes When Quantity

References

is Constrained,” Journal of Business and

Economics Statistics, 13(1), 95-103
Ailawadi, Kusum L., Zhang, Jie, Krishna,

Brown, S. J. and J. B. Warner (1980), “Mea-

Aradhna and Kruger, Michael W. (2010),

suring security price performance, Journal

“When Wal-Mart Enters: How Incumbent

of Financial Economics, 8(3), 205-258

Retailers React and How This Affects Their

Carpenter, Gregory S. and Nakamoto, Kent

SalesOutcomes,” Journal of Marketing Re-

(1990), “Competitive Strategies for Late

search, 47(August), 577-593

Entry Into A Market With A Dominant

Basker, Emek (2005) “Selling a cheaper mouse-

Brand,” Management Science, 36(10), 1268-

The Effect of New brand’s Entry on the Price Strategy of Incumbent Retailers 99

1278

United Kingdom on the Performance of

Chen, Ming-Jer (1996), “Competitor Analysis
and Interfirm Rivalry: Toward A Theoretical
Integration,” Academic of Management Re-

view, 21(1), 100-134

European Retailers,” Journal of Marketing

Research, 45(October), 519-534
Gimeno, J., and Chen, M. J. (1998), “The
Dynamics of Competitive Positioning: A

Chintagunta, Pradeep K., Bonfrer, Andre and
Song, Inseong (2002), “Investigating the

Pair-Wise Perspective, Academy of Manage-

ment Proceedings, 1-8

effects of Store-Brand Introduction on Re-

Greve, H. R. (1996), “Patterns of Competition:

tailer Demand and Pricing Behavior,” Ma-

The Diffusion of a Market Position in

nagement Science, 48(10), 1242, 1267

Radio Broadcasting, Administrative Science

Choi, Pilsik and Coulter, Keith S. (2012), “It’s

Quarterly, 41, 29-60

Not all Relative: The Effects of Mental

Hauser, John R. (1998), “Competitive Price

and Physical Positioning of Comparative

and Positioning Strategies,” Marketing

Prices on Absolute versus Relative Discount

Science, 7(Winter), 76-91

Assessment,” Journal of Retailing, 88(4),

Hausman, Jerry A. (1981), “Exact Consumer’s
Surplus and Deadweight Loss,” The American

512-527
Choi, S. Chan, Desarbo, Wayne S. and Harker,

Economic Review, 71(4), 662-676

Patrick T. (1990) ‘Product Positioning under

Hausman, Jerry A. and Leibtag, Ephraim (2007),

Price Competition’, Marketing Science, 36

“Consumer Benefits From Increased Com-

(February)

petition In Shopping Outlets: Measuring

Corrado, Charles J. (2011), “Event studies: A
methodology review,” Accounting and

Finance, 51, 207-234

The Effect Of Wal-Mart,” Journal of

Applied Econometrics, 22, 1157-1177
Iyer, Ganesh and Seetharaman, P. B. (2008),

Geyskens, Inge, Gielens, Katrijn and Gijsbrechts,

“Too Close to be Similar: Product and Price

Els (2010), “Proliferating Private-Label

Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets,”

Portfolios: How Introducing Economy and

Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 6

Premium Private Labels Influences Brand

(3), 205-234

Choice,” Journal of Marketing Research,
48(October), 791-807

Jain, Dipak C. and Rao, Ram C. (1990), “Effect
of Price on the Demand for Durables:

Gielens, Katrijn, Van de Gucht, Linda M.,

Modeling, Estimation, and Findings,” Journal

Steenkamp, Jan-Benedict E.M. and Deimpe,

of Business and Economic Statistics, 8(2),

Marnik G. (2008), “Dancing with a Giant:

163-170

The Effect of Wal-Mart’s Entry into the
100 ASIA MARKETING JOURNAL

Vol. 17 No. 03 October 2015

Kalyanaram, Gurumurthy and Urban, Glen L.

(1992), “Dynamic Effects of the Order of

Labels Increase Retailer Bargaining Power?,”

Entry on Market Share, Trial Penetration,

Quantatitive Marketing and Economics, 8,

and Repeat Purchases for Frequently Pur-

333-363

chased Consumer Goods,” Marketing Science,
11(3), 235-250

Pepe, Michael S., Abratt, Russell and Dion, Paul
(2012), “Competitive advantage, Private-

Kolari, James W. and Pynnonen, Seppo (2010),

label brands and category profitability,”

“Event Study Testing with Cross-Sectional

Journal of Marketing Management, 28

Correlation of Abnormal Returns,” The

(February), 154-172

review of Financial Studies, 23, 3996-4025

Pinkse, Joris, Slade, Margaret. E. and Brett,

Kyriakopoulos, Kyriakos (2004), “The Impact

Craig (2002), “Spatial Price Competition:

of Cooperative Structure and Firm Culture

A Semiparametric Approach,” Econometrica,

on Market Orientation and Performance,"

70(3), 1111-53

Agribusiness, 20(4), 379-396

Pfeffer, J., and G. R. Salancik (1978), The

Lam, Son K., Ahearne, Michael, Hu, Ye and

external Control of organizations: A Re-

Schillewaert, Niels (2010), “Resistance to

source Dependence Perspective, New York,

Brand Switching When a Radically New

Harper & Row

Brand is Introduced: A Social Identity

Pofahl, Geoffrey M., Capps JR, Oral and Love,

Theory Perspective,” Journal of Marketing,

H. Alan (2006) “Retail Zone Pricing and

74(November), 128-146

Simulated Price Effects of Upstream Mer-

Lamey, Lien, Deleersnyder, Barbara, Steenkamp,
Han-Benedict E.M. and Dekimpe, Marnik

gers,” International Journal of the Econo-

mics of Business, 13(2), 195-215

G. (2012), “The Effect of Business-Cycle

Sayman, Serdar, Hoch, Stephen J. and Raju,

Fluctuations on Private-Label Share: What

Jagmohan S. (2002), “Positioning of Store

Has Marketing Conduct Got to Do with

Brands,” MarketingScience,21(4),378-397

it?,” Journal of Marketing, 76(January), 1-19

Shankar, Venkatesh, Carpenter, Gregory S. and

Liberman, Marvin B. and Asaba, Shigeru (2006),

Krishnamurthi, Lakshman (1998), “Late

“Why Do Firms Imitate Each Other?”

Mover Advantage: How Innovative Late

Academy of Management Review, 31(2),

Entrants Outsell Pioneers,” Journal of Mar-

366-385

keting Research, 35(February), 54-70

Madkinlay, A. Craig (1997) “Event Studies in

Shin, Sang-Cheol and Burke, Dock (2010), “A

Economics and Finance,” Journal of Eco-

Comparison of Hausman’s and Breslow-

nomic Literature, 35, 13-39

Smith’s methods in estimating consumer

Meza, Sergio and Sudhir K. (2010), “Do Private

welfare loss because of fuel taxes,” Inter-

The Effect of New brand’s Entry on the Price Strategy of Incumbent Retailers 101

